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Abstract—Federated learning has been widely studied and
applied to various scenarios. In mobile computing scenarios,
federated learning protects users from exposing their private
data, while cooperatively training the global model for a variety
of real-world applications. However, the security of federated
learning is increasingly being questioned, due to the malicious
clients or central servers’ constant attack to the global model or
user privacy data. To address these security issues, we proposed a
decentralized federated learning framework based on blockchain,
i.e., a Blockchain-based Federated Learning framework with
Committee consensus (BFLC). The framework uses blockchain
for the global model storage and the local model update exchange.
To enable the proposed BFLC, we also devised an innovative
committee consensus mechanism, which can effectively reduce the
amount of consensus computing and reduce malicious attacks. We
then discussed the scalability of BFLC, including theoretical secu-
rity, storage optimization, and incentives. Finally, we performed
experiments using real-world datasets to verify the effectiveness
of the BFLC framework.
Index Terms—Blockchain, Federated learning, Validation con-
sensus, Robustness
I. INTRODUCTION
With the introduction of GDPR, both industry and academia
began to pay more attention to the privacy protection of
machine learning. User-generated private data should not be
exposed or uploaded to a central server. Google proposed
Federated Learning (FL) in 2016 to solve the problem of
collaborative training for privacy protection. FL proposes a
distributed training model with two roles: the participating
devices and the central server. Instead of uploading private
data, nodes locally update the global model and then upload
the model updates (i.e., the local gradients). The central server
collects these updates and integrates them to form an updated
model. Because of this privacy feature, FL is attracting more
and more researchers’ attention in recent years.
In FL settings, a server performs the central operations
of update aggregation, client selection, global model main-
tenance. The server needs to collect updates from numerous
clients to complete the aggregation operation, and it also needs
to broadcast a new global model to these clients, which puts a
high demand on network bandwidth. Also, cloud-based servers
are affected by the stability of cloud service providers [1]. A
centralized server can skew the global model by favoring some
clients. Moreover, some malicious central servers can poison
the model and even collect clients’ privacy data from updates.
Therefore, the stability, fairness, and security of the central
server are crucial to FL.
A direct idea is to remove the server and execute the central
tasks on distributed client nodes. The blockchain, which is
viewed as decentralized storage, can serve as the basis for
maintaining FL. In detail, we can design protocols to execute
the aggregation task on clients. BAFFLE [2] mentions using
blockchain to store and share the global model, and using
perform aggregation with smart contracts. With the removal of
the central server, the above challenges need not be considered.
However, the computation and network transmission pressure
of this task are all transferred to the nodes. In particular, when
all nodes have to deal with consensus tasks, the computational
overhead per round is huge.
Zhou et al. [3] propose using blockchain to maintain the
global model within a community and reach a consensus,
and leveraging allreduce protocolto transmit and update the
model among multiple communities. The global model is
updated continuously and promoted by various communities.
Chen et al. [4] propose to leverage the blockchain to record
the updates from nodes and the evaluation of that updates.
Underrated nodes may be kicked out of the community as
a defense against malicious devices. However, maintaining
multiple blockchains at the same time [3] is not conducive to
model sharing, and nodes in different communities can hardly
obtain models or update records of other communities. If a
community as a whole is malicious, it is difficult for other
honest communities to detect and resist, then a trusty global
detection might be needed.
Through the literature review, it would be an effective way
for blockchain to serve as an effective decentralized storage
and replace the central FL servers. However, the efficiency of
consensus is in urgent need of improvement. Although storing
models and model updates in blockchain brings many security
advantages, it is also a huge burden of the storage capacity on
blockchain nodes. Therefore, how to reduce the consumption
of a blockchain-based FL is also a key challenge.
In this article, we propose a decentralized, autonomous
blockchain-based FL architecture to address these challenges
(shown in Figure 1). With respect to the management of FL
nodes, the architecture based on the alliance chain ensures
the node permission control. In terms of storage, we design
the storage pattern on the chain of models and updates, and
via this pattern, the nodes can get the latest model quickly.
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2Each validated update is recorded and kept untampered on the
blockchain. Considering the huge storage consumption on the
blockchain, partial nodes can abandon the historical blocks
to release the storage space. In terms of the block consensus
mechanism, a novel committee consensus mechanism is pro-
posed, which can only increase a few validation consumptions
and achieve more stability under malicious attacks. In each
round of FL, updates are validated and packaged by a small
number of nodes (i.e., the committee). The committee consen-
sus mechanism allows most honest nodes to reinforce each
other and continuously improve the global model. A small
number of incorrect or malicious node updates will be ignored
to avoid damaging the global model. In the meantime, the
BFLC training community is flexible, where the nodes can join
or leave at any time without damaging the training process.
Combined with an effective incentive mechanism, the nodes
who contribute can gain actual rewards, thus promoting the
development of the whole training community in a virtuous
circle.
Our contributions are summarized as follows.
• We propose a blockchain-based FL framework BFLC,
which defines the model storage patterns, the training
process and a novel committee consensus in detail.
• We technically discuss the scalability of BFLC, including
the node management in the community, the analysis of
malicious node attacks, and the storage optimization.
• We demonstrate the effectiveness of BFLC by exper-
iments on real-world FL dataset. We also verify the
security of BFLC by simulating the malicious attacks.
II. RELATED WORK
Konecn et al. proposed Federated Learning whose goal is
to train a high-quality centralized model while training data
remains distributed over a large number of clients [1]. The
network situation of FL is unreliable and relatively slow, and
the clients are not always online. In these years, FL is applied
in many scenarios like video analysis, information inspection,
and classification, credit card fraud detection while keeping the
personal data sensitivity safe. Besides, the theoretical studies
of convergence, network latency or malicious attacks on FL
are also active fields.
The centralized federated server has been challenged and
questioned growly in these years. It is a natural thought that
keeping the concept of server at a minimum or even avoiding
it completely. The study of [5] assumed that the data remains
at the edge devices, but it requires no aggregation server or
any central component. Hu et al. [6] proposed a segmented
gossip approach, which makes full utilization of node-to-node
bandwidth then can achieve a convergence efficiently.
Meanwhile, decentralization may be the most direct way
to avoid the above risks. Blockchain, a distributed ledger
technique, can store the historical operations and keep it
tamper-resistant. With the aim of the blockchain, collaborative
machine learning methods can get rid of the centralized
server and improve security. Blaz et al. [7] proposed a ma-
chine learning-based method to fasten the transaction signing
process while also including a personalized identification of
anomalous transactions. Deep reinforcement learning is also
applied on blockchain-based scenarios, such as industrial
Internet of things, mobile edge computing, cognitive radio
networksand Internet of vehicle.
In recent years, FL is an emerging research focus on the
blockchain system.It is reasonable to assume that the clients
in FL might be malicious. Therefore, the local updates from all
clients should be recorded under blockchain-based FL settings.
You et al. [8] focused on the stability and convergence speed
of FL, and proposed a blockchain-based method to address
these challenges. Umer et al. [9] propose a blockchain-based
architecture, which can perform parallel learning for multiple
global models. Bao et al. [10] proposed a public blockchain-
based FL architecture, which provides trusty consensus basing
on nodes’ data amount and historical performance.
These blockchain-based learning methods can effectively
record the nodes’ performance to reduce malicious attacks.
However, there are still three main challenges:
1) Consensus efficiency. It is an inevitable process for
blockchain-based methods to reach a consensus for each
packing block. Considering the vast amount of learning
nodes in the FL settings, a broadcasting consensus is
highly time-consuming. Therefore, reducing the consen-
sus cost is non-trivial. One [10] of the related works
selects a leader to execute the consensus. However, the
criterion relies on many outer data.
2) Model security. The framework should prevent the
global model from exposing to unauthorized devices and
from poisoning. The security of the system is rarely
studied under blockchain-based FL settings.
3) Framework scalability. When applying these training
frameworks to real-world applications, we always need
to add detail rules to adapt to different scenarios.
Therefore, the scalability of frameworks determines their
scope of applications.
In the following sections, we will describe our proposed
methods to tackle these challenges.
III. THE PROPOSED FRAMEWORK
Federated Learning (FL) enables the machine learning al-
gorithms training across multiple distributed clients without
exchanging their data samples. In the original FL settings,
one centralized server takes control of the training process,
including client management, global model maintenance, and
gradient aggregation. During each training round, the server
broadcasts the current model to some participating nodes.
After receiving the model, nodes locally update it with their
local data and submit the update gradients to the server. The
server then aggregates and applies the local gradients into the
model for the next round.
The decentralized nature of blockchain can replace the
place of the central server. As aforementioned, the functions
of the centralized server can be implemented by the Smart
Contract (SC) instead, and be actuated by transactions on
the blockchain. To tackle this vision, we propose BFLC,
which is a Blockchain-based Federated Learning framework
with Committee consensus. Without any centralized server,
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Fig. 1. The training process of the proposed BFLC framework. (1) Training nodes acquire the newest global model and perform local training. (2) Training
nodes send local updates to committee (3) Committee validate the updates and record new model or updates onto blockchain.
the participating nodes perform FL via blockchain, which
maintains the global models and local updates. Considering
the communication cost of FL, we leverage a novel delegated
consensus mechanism to tackle the missions of gradients
selection and blocks generation. In the following sub-sections,
we will elaborate on the various components of the framework.
A. Blockchain Storage
To enable authority control, the storage of BFLC is an
alliance blockchain system, and only the authorized devices
can access the FL training contents. On the blockchain, we
design two different blocks to store the global model and local
update (as shown in Figure 2), which are collectively known
as learning information. For the sake of simplicity, we assume
that only one learning information is placed in a block.
In the beginning, a randomly initialized model was placed
into the #0 block, then the 0-th round of training starts. Nodes
access the current model and execute local training, and put
the verified local gradients to new update blocks. When there
are continuously enough update blocks, the smart contract
triggers the aggregation, and a new model of the next round is
generated and placed on the chain. We should note that the FL
training only relies on the latest model block, and the historical
block is stored for failure fallback and block verification.
We denote the number of required updates for each round
as k, and denote the number of rounds as t = 0, 1, .... Then we
have: the # t× (k+1) block contains the model of t-th round,
which is called model block, and the # [t×(k+1)+1, (t+1)×
(k+1)−1] blocks contain the updates of t-th rounds, which are
called update blocks. From an implementation perspective, one
model block should includes: block headers, number of round
t and global model, while one update block includes: block
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Fig. 2. The FL storage structure on blockchain system, and the provided
functions.
headers, number of round t, local update gradient, uploader
address and update score.
B. Committee Consensus Mechanism
The chain structure of blockchain guarantees the immutabil-
ity. Therefore, appending the correct blocks to the chain is a
crucial component which is the consensus mechanisms work
for. The competition-based consensus mechanisms append
blocks on the chain first, whereafter, the consensus meets.
Conversely, the communication-based generate mechanisms
reach an agreement before appending blocks.
Considering the computation and communication cost of
consensus, we propose an efficient and secure Committee
Consensus Mechanism (CCM) to validate the local gradi-
ents before appending it to the chain. Under this setting, a
few honest nodes will constitute a committee in charge of
4verification of local gradients and blocks generation. In the
meantime, the rest nodes execute local training and send the
local updates to the committee. The committee then validates
the updates and assign a score on them. Only the qualified
updates will be packed onto the blockchain. At the beginning
of the next round, a new committee is elected basing on
the scores of nodes in the previous round, which means that
the committee will not be re-elected. It is noteworthy that
the update validation is a pivotal component of the CCM,
therefore, we describe a feasible approach: the committee
members validate the local updates by treating their data as
a validation set, and the validation accuracy becomes the
score. This is the minimized approach that acquires no further
operation of the committee, but only the basic ability to run the
learning model. After combining the scores from the various
committee members, the median will become the score of this
update.
Working with this mechanism, BFLC can achieve these
advantages:
1) High efficiency: only a few nodes will validate the
updates, rather than broadcasting to every node and
reach an agreement.
2) K-fold cross-validation: the committee members will not
participate in the local training in the round. Therefore,
the local data of the committee are taken as a validation
set. As the alternating of committee members at each
round, the validation set changes as well. In this setting,
k-fold cross-validation on FL achieved.
3) Anti-malevolence: based on the validation scores, the
corresponding nodes with better performance will be
elected by the smart contract and constitute the new
committee for the next training round. which means the
selected local data distribution is gregarious and the node
is not malicious.
C. Model Training
Nodes other than committees perform local training each
round. In FL, for the sake of security and privacy, raw data
will be kept in nodes locally, and these nodes only upload the
gradients to the blockchain. Furthermore, there are two main
challenges:
1) The local data distribution might be not Independent and
Identically Distributed (non-IID)
2) The devices are not always available
To address the first challenge, only a certain number of local
updates are requisite for each round, and the committee con-
sensus mechanism could maximize the generalization ability
of the global model by validating the local updates with
committee members’ data distribution [1]. To address the
second one, we design an initiative local learning progress
for nodes.
Nodes can actively obtain the current global model at any
time and perform local training. The gradients will be sent
to the committee and be validated. When eligible updates
are packaged on the blockchain, as a reward, tokens can be
attached to them. We will discuss the incentive in the next
section.
As aforementioned, a certain number of valid updates
are required for each round. Therefore, when the commit-
tee validates enough local updates, the aggregation process
is activated. These validated updates are aggregated by the
committee into a new global model. The aggregation can be
performed on the local gradients [11] or the local models
[12], and the network transmission consumptions of these two
methods are equal. After the new global model is packed on
the blockchain, the committee will be elected again, and the
next training round begins.
IV. DISCUSSION
A. Node Management and Incentive
The BFLC training process depends on the mutual pro-
motion of nodes, and node management is also a key part
of BFLC. The participant nodes can not only access the
global model but can also upload updates to affect the global
model. To control permissions, we have designated the initial
nodes that constitute the training community to be responsible
for node management, i.e., to be the managers. Each device
must be verified by the managers before joining the training
community. This verification is in blacklist mode: if the device
has been kicked out of the community for misconduct (such
as submitting misleading updates, spreading a private model),
the device will be rejected.
Depending on the proposed blockchain storage structure, the
latest global model can be quickly found on the chain after
new nodes joined. Nodes can immediately use the model to
complete their local tasks, or they can update the model with
local data and gain scores on the chain after verification by
the consensus committee. It is noteworthy that only a certain
number of valid updates are required for aggregation at each
round, and only part of nodes are online to participate as well.
Therefore, as long as the nodes actively submit updates, it is
likely to participate in the global model updating and gain
scores. Meanwhile, partial offline nodes will not impede FL
progress.
Nodes in a community can always use the model without
committing updates, so an effective incentive is required to
encourage nodes to provide updates to the global model. To
address this problem, we propose an incentive mechanism
called profit sharing by contribution.
• Permission fee: each device should pay for the access
permission of the global model, and these fees are kept
by the managers. Nodes then have unlimited access to
the latest models in the community.
• Profit sharing: After aggregation of each round, the
managers distribute rewards to the corresponding nodes
basing on the scores of their submitted updates.
As a result, frequently providing updates could earn more
rewards, and the constantly updated global model will attract
more nodes to participate. This incentive mechanism has high
scalability to adapt to different real-world applications. For
instance, the configurations of the permission fee, the profit-
sharing proportion or the dividend modes are worth studying.
5B. Committee Election
At the end of each round, a new committee is elected from
the providers of validated updates. In decentralized training
settings, this election significantly affects the performance
of the global model, because the committee decides which
local updates will be aggregated. Committee election methods
include the following categories:
• Random election: new committee members are randomly
selected from validated nodes. From a machine learning
perspective, this approach improves the generalization of
the model and reduces overfitting. However, the resis-
tance to malicious attacks is weak while the malicious
nodes disguise as normal ones.
• Election by score: the providers with top validation scores
constitute the new committee. This may exacerbate the
uneven distribution of samples due to the absence of
partial nodes into the committee. However, for malicious
node attacks, this approach significantly increases the cost
of the attack and brings more security and stability.
• Multi-factor optimization: this approach considers multi-
ple factors of the device (i.e., the network transmission
rate) and the validation scores for optimal election. How-
ever, this optimization will bring additional computing
overhead. Therefore, this approach should be applied
depending on the realistic scenario and the associated
requirements.
C. Malicious Nodes
A malicious node is defined as a node submitting incorrect,
malicious model updates. In the original FL settings, FedAvg
[12] aggregates all the updates into a new global model. If
there are malicious updates, the global model will be poisoned
and obtains lower performance. As aforementioned, under the
CCM, the updates will be verified by the committee before
being aggregated. In this sub-section, we theoretically analyze
the factors and the success possibility of malicious attacks.
We denote the amount of all nodes as N , in which the
amount of committee members is M , and the rest N − M
nodes are training nodes. Distinctly, a malicious update is
accepted to the aggregation if and only if more than M2 com-
mittee members are cooperating with. However, the committee
members are the M of the best performers at last round,
which means these malicious committee members’ updates are
accepted by other M2 malicious nodes in the last committee. It
is an infinite dependency loop, therefore, as long as there are
more than M2 honest nodes in the first committee, no malicious
node could enter the committee and harm the global model.
Considering another extreme situation: the malicious nodes
conspire together to earn the committee seats by pretending
as normal nodes. When the malicious nodes hold half of the
seats, the attack begins. To analyze this attack mode, we denote
the amount of participating nodes as A, the percentage of
malicious nodes in A is q ∈ (0, 1), and the percentage of the
committee is p ∈ (0, 1). The attack target is holding more than
A×p
2 seats in committee. We assume that the performance of
each node is similar. Therefore, the attack success probability
can be calculated as the probability of this event: extracting
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Fig. 3. The attack success probability changing along with p and q.
A × p nodes from A nodes, more than half of which come
from A × q. By fixing A = 1000, we plot the probability
change along p and q in Figure 3. We should note that, only
when the malicious percentage greater than 50%, the attack
success probability could be greater than 0 markedly. This
conclusion is similar to the 51% attack in the PoW blockchain
system. In other words, in a decentralized community, the
malicious nodes should hold 51% computational resources to
attack the system, where the cost far outweighs the benefit.
Furthermore, the historical models and updates are stored on
the blockchain, therefore, failback is always an option after
the attack happened.
D. Storage Optimization
In real-world applications, storage overhead is an important
factor that determines the hardware requirements for the
training devices. Based on the above-mentioned blockchain
storage scheme (as shown in Figure 2), the latest global model
can be found quickly. Although historical models and updates
can provide post-disaster recovery functions, they also occupy
huge storage space. Here, we give a simple and feasible
storage overhead reduction scheme: nodes with insufficient
capacity can delete historical blocks locally, and only keep
the latest model and updates of the current round. In this
way, the problem of insufficient storage space on some nodes
can be solved, while the ability to recover from disasters and
block verification is retained on the core nodes. However, the
shortcomings of this method are also obvious. The credibility
of the blockchain decreases with the deletion of nodes. In a
mutually distrusting training community, each node may not
use this scheme for security concerns.
Therefore, trusted and reliable third-party storage may be a
better solution. The blockchain only maintains the network
address where each model or updated file is located and
records of modification operations. Other nodes interact with
the centralized storage to obtain the latest model or upload up-
dates. This centralized storage will be responsible for disaster
recovery backup and distributed file storage services.
V. EXPERIMENTAL
A. Settings and Normal Training
To demonstrate the effectiveness of the BFLC, we per-
form it on the real-world federated dataset FEMNIST [13].
6TABLE I
ACCURACY OF BFLC, BASIC FL AND STAND-ALONE ON FEMINST DATASET WITH DIFFERENT PROPORTION OF ACTIVE NODES
Frameworks proportion k% of active nodes10% 20% 30% 40% 50%
BFLC 89.33% 89.89% 90.02% 89.87% 89.78%
Basic FL 90.02% 90.20% 90.29% 90.11% 90.42%
Stand-alone 91.34%
This dataset contains 80,5263 samples and 3550 users for
handwritten character image classification tasks and contains
62 different classes (10 digits, 26 lowercase, 26 uppercase).
Following the instruction of the dataset, we simulate 900
devices in the training community, where the local datasets
are unbalanced in number and not independent in distribution.
After the active nodes are randomly selected, we perform
the local training and aggregate via memory. We employed
a blockchain system named FISCO 1 with PBFT consensus
on an Intel Core CPU i9-9900X with a clock rate of 3.50
GHz with 10 cores and 2 threads per core. The SC layer
was developed using the Solidity programming language. The
learning model is written with Python 3.7.6 and Tensorflow
1.14.0 and is executed on Geforce RTX 2080Ti GPUs.
We compare the BFLC with the basic FL [12] framework
and the stand-alone training framework as the baseline. Each
framework performs the classic image classification model
AlexNet [14] as the global model and fixed a set of model
hyper-parameters to ensure fairness. In terms of the experimen-
tal settings, we defined the proportion of active nodes in each
round as k%, among which 40% will be elected as committee
members in the next round for BFLC. The proportion of
training nodes for Basic FL is also k%. Meanwhile, stand-
alone training will leverage the whole dataset. Under the
conditions of different k values, we recorded their performance
in Table I.
As can be seen in Table I, with the increase in the proportion
of active nodes, the performance of BFLC keeps approaching
the effect of the basic FL framework and only has a slight loss
compared to the stand-alone training with the intact dataset.
We should mention that the BFLC can significantly reduce the
consumption of consensus through the committee consensus
mechanism. For instance, if the number of training nodes
is P and the size of the committee is Q, then the active
nodes are P + Q. For BFLC, the amount of calculation per
round of consensus can be expressed as P × Q, while the
broadcasting approach is (P + Q)2. Compared with stand-
alone training, BFLC also has the privacy data protection
function of federated learning and does not require a trusted
central server to manage, which significantly reduces the risk
of privacy leakage.
B. Under Malicious Attack
The malicious nodes in the training community will gener-
ate harmful updates, which will significantly reduce the per-
formance of the global model if being integrated. In this sub-
section, we simulate malicious node attacks to demonstrate
1https://github.com/fisco-bcos
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Fig. 4. Performance of methods under malicious attacks.
how the proposed BFLC, basic FL, and CwMed [15] will be
affected under different malicious proportions among active
nodes. We assume that the attack mode of the malicious node
is random perturbation with a pointwise Gaussian random
noise.
The basic FL will not perform any defense measures, and
model updates generated by randomly selected active nodes
will be integrated. CwMed constructs a global gradient, where
each entry is the median of entries in the local gradients with
the same coordinate. BFLC relies on the committee consensus
mentioned above to resist the attack. Each update will obtain
a score from the committee (i.e., the median local prediction
accuracy).
In order to enhance the effectiveness of the attack, we
assume that malicious nodes are collusion, that is, members
of the malicious committee will give random high scores (for
example, 90% 1˜00%) to the malicious updates. The proportion
of active nodes is fixed as 10%, and 20% of them will
be elected as the committee in the next round. As shown
in Figure 4, the BFLC can resist much higher malicious
nodes proportion than the compared methods. This indicates
the effectiveness of BFLC with the help of the committee
mechanism.
VI. CONCLUSION
The security of federated learning is facing increasing
challenges. Malicious FL training nodes would damage the
global model, while a malicious central server can also leak
the nodes’ private data. Based on a trusted blockchain system,
we propose BFLC, which is a decentralized, federated learning
framework exploiting the committee consensus. Such the
committee consensus can effectively avoid the influence of
malicious central servers or malicious nodes. In the experiment
section, we verified the effectiveness of the BFLC framework
by adopting the real-world dataset, which can obtain a global
model similar to the centralized training in a federated learning
7framework. We also discussed the scalability of BFLC, which
has broad research prospects in security, data storage, and
incentive mechanisms.
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